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NOTES

Section 8(b)(4)(B) Limitations on Union
Enforcement of Work Preservation Agreements
Work preservation agreements (in which an employer agrees not
to use materials which have been prefabricatedand thus displace
union labor) are common in the construction industry. In practice, these agreements are sometimes difficult to enforce because
the employer who has signed the collective bargainingagreement
is not always the one who specifies which materials will be used
at the jobsite. In NLRB v. Enterprise the Supreme Court held
that work preservation agreements between a union and an employer may not be used to coerce a nonunion company to discontinue using prefabricatedmaterials which violate the work preservation agreement, although the nonunion company has hired a
union employer to install the prefabricatedmaterials. The author
examines the Court's decision and concludes that legal and economic considerationsmandated the Court's holding.
Austin Company, Inc. (Austin) was the general contractor and
engineer on the Norwegian Home for the Aged construction project.
As part of the project, Austin subcontracted to Hudik-Ross Company, Inc. (Hudik) the heating, ventilation, and air conditioning
work. The subcontract specified that Austin would purchase certain
climate control units manufactured by Slant/Fin Corporation
(Slant/Fin) and that the internal piping in these units would be
performed at the factory by Slant/Fin.
At the time Hudik accepted the subcontract with Austin, he

was party to a collective bargaining agreement with Enterprise Association (Enterprise), a plumbing and pipefitting union. The
collective bargaining agreement provided that the internal piping
work on heating and air conditioning units (work traditionally performed by the union) was work to be done by union members on the
jobsite. Hudik was aware that its employees would be called on to
install the Slant/Fin units but would not do the internal piping on
these units even though this work was covered by the work preservation clause in the collective bargaining agreement. When the units
arrived, the union steamfitters refused to install them stating that
the piping was steamfitter's work and that the factory units violated
their contract. Austin filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Board' (the Board) alleging that Enterprise had committed an unfair labor practice under section 8(b) (4) (B) of the National
Labor Relations Act 2 (NLRA) by encouraging Hudik's employees to
1. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters, 204 N.L.R.B. 760, 762 (1973).
2. Section 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1970) provides:
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refuse to install the units. The Board found that the union's action
was based on a valid work preservation clause and was for the purpose of preserving work traditionally performed by the union. Nevertheless, the Board held the union had violated section 8(b)(4)(B)
in seeking to enforce its collective bargaining agreement. The Board
concluded that since Hudik lacked control over the assignment of
the disputed work, the union's purpose in refusing to install the pipe
must be either to force a change in Austin's manner of doing business or to force Hudik to terminate its subcontract with Austin.3
This was illegal secondary pressure.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the
Board's order.4 The union's refusal to install the prefabricated units
was primary activity if taken for the sole purpose of preserving work
the employees had traditionally performed.' As primary activity, it
was not within the scope of section 8(b)(4)(B). Citing National
Woodwork Manufacturers Association v. NLRB,5 the court held
that the Board's. continued reliance on its "right-to-control" test
was invalid. Recognizing an apparent conflict between the circuits,7
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents...
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in any industry affecting commerce to engage in,
a strike or refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, wherein either
case an object thereof is(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . . Provided,
that nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful,
where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing.
3. 204 N.L.R.B. at 760.
4. Enterprise Ass'n of Steam Pipefitters v. NLRB, 521 F.2d 885 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
5. Id. at 904. The determination as to whether the sole purpose is work preservation must
be made by inquiring into all the circumstances. Because there was substantial evidence,
apart from rationalization by the Board, that the union also had the purpose of achieving
objectives elsewhere, the court remanded to the Board for reconsideration of the question of
the union's purpose in refusing to handle the Slant/Fin units. The court emphasized, however,
that the struck employer's legal control over assignment of the work sought to be preserved
could be considered only as one of many factors indicating a possible forbidden objective.
Those other factors are found in National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 611, 644
n.38, 646 (1967): remoteness of the threat of displacement by banned products or services,
history of relations between the union and boycotted employers, economic personality of the
industry, and whether or not boycotted goods were themselves union goods. These factors
were summarized by the court as "the substance, history, and motivation of the particular
dispute . . . with particular emphasis on identifying the employer whose labor relations are
being affected." 521 F.2d 885, 904-05 & n.47. (original emphasis).
6. 386 U.S. 612 (1967). See note 19 infra and accompanying text.
7. Six circuits had addressed the control issue after the Court's decision in National
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the Supreme Court granted certiorari8 and held, reversed: A work
preservation agreement valid under section 8(e) may not be enforced by means that would violate section 8(b)(4)(B) in absence of
the agreement. The Board's right-to-control test takes account of
"all the surrounding circumstances" as required by National Woodwork and the Board's conclusion that the union exerted secondary
pressure in seeking to enforce a work preservation agreement against
an employer without control over the work was supported by substantial evidence on the record as whole. NLRB v. Enterprise
Association, 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
In recent years, the introduction of prefabricated materials into
the construction industry has threatened the job security of many
craft unions. In response, unions have sought to protect the job

opportunities of their members by insisting on clauses in collective
bargaining agreements that preserve to the unit employees all work
that has been traditionally performed by them. Typically, the
clause will either prohibit a subcontractor from accepting contracts
that use materials manufactured off the jobsite or it will prohibit a
general contractor from subcontracting work relating to certain
specified jobs (those traditionally performed by the union). Major
labor disputes have arisen over enforcement of these clauses with
employers claiming union enforcement violates section 8(b)(4)(B) of
the NLRA and the unions defending by arguing, that work preservation demands are primary and therefore outside the reach of that
section. The dispute has been particularly heated in the "right-tocontrol" cases where the union is seeking to enforce a work preservation agreement against an employer who does not have the power
to give the union the work it claims. In these cases, the Board and
circuit courts have been faced with the nearly impossible task of
reconciling the union's demand for preservation of bargaining unit
work with an employer's right to freely contract for the kinds of
materials he desires. Enterprise illustrates the inability to agree on
how the conflict should be resolved. The difficulty arises from the
consequence of allowing the union to use economic pressure to preserve work in the situation where its immediate employer does not
control the choice of materials. A second employer, usually a general
contractor or architect, not a party to the work preservation clause,
Woodwork. The Third, Eighth, and District of Columbia expressly rejected the Board's control test. The Fourth Circuit sustained the test in George Koch Sons, Inc. v. NLRB, 490 F.2d
323 (4th Cir. 1973). The Ninth Circuit appears to have done the same. See Associated Gen.
Contractors v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1976). But see Western Monoliths Concrete
Prod. Inc. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1971).
8. 424 U.S. 908 (1976).
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is confronted with the union's refusal to handle the prefabricated
materials. Oftentimes, he will decide to forego the use of these materials. This in turn has resulted in the foreclosure of the manufacturers of prefabricated materials from the construction industry.
The Board resolves the conflict by limiting the union's ability
to keep prefabricated materials off the jobsite to the situation where
the immediate employer has control over the decision to use prefabricated materials. Since the Supreme Court had held that work
preservation is a primary objective and that work preservation
agreements are primary also, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the Board's control test as being inconsistent with the case
law that has developed for determining when union conduct is unlawful secondary pressure. It is the premise of this note that although the District of Columbia Circuit was correct in its holding,
the Supreme Court, in deciding Enterprise,was compelled to decide
that the Board could continue to use the control test. To hold otherwise would have allowed labor unions to keep prefabricated materials out of a substantial portion of the construction industry; a result
not only at odds with a national economic policy based on principles
of competition and free access to markets, but also inconsistent with
congressional intent to use the secondary boycott sections of the
NLRA to prohibit union anticompetitive activities.' Thus, the purpose of this note is to examine the Court's decision in the context
of the case law that has developed around section 8(b)(4)(B) and to
show how the antitrust problems inherent in the right-to-control
situation have forced the Court to reach a result inconsistent with
that case law.
A union commits an unfair labor practice under section
8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA' ° when it either induces employees to refuse
to handle particular goods, or coerces any person engaged in commerce, where an object of this action is to force any person to cease
doing business with any other person. This section is generally referred to as the "secondary boycott" section of the NLRA." Unions
9. See Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 639-46
(1975).
10. For text of § 8(b)(4)(B) see note 2 supra. The original section 8(b)(4)(B) appeared
as section 8(b)(4)(A) in the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor Management Relations Act (TaftHartley), 29 U.S.C. § 158(19) (1970). In the 1959 amendments, the sections were renumbered
and a proviso was added to section 8(b)(4)(B) making explicit that the statute was aimed
only at secondary pressures. The Board and courts in their interpretation of section 8(b)(4)(A)
had limited the section to secondary conduct. The proviso merely codified this construction.
See NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
11. Although the section does not specifically mention the secondary boycott, the legislative history surrounding the enactment of the section as well as its judicial construction
demonstrate that the purpose of the statute was to prohibit that type of activity. See, e.g.,
S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8, 22, 54 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE
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engage in secondary boycotts when, in order to impair the business
of an employer with whom they are in dispute (the primary employer), they use economic pressure against a neutral or
"secondary" employer doing business with the primary employer.
The union's goal is to force the secondary employer to cease doing
business with the primary employer in the hope that this loss of
business will "persuade" the employer to accept the union's demands. 2
While it is well understood that the purpose of the provision is
to prohibit secondary pressures, the wording of section 8(b)(4)(B)
fails to distinguish between such activities and other forms of union
pressure protected by sections 7 and 13 of the Act. 3 In construing
the section, both the Board and the courts have recognized that
nearly all concerted activity will produce some secondary consequences affecting neutral parties. To ensure the union's right to take
concerted action against the primary party in a labor dispute, the
Board and the courts were called upon to determine when union
activity ceased to be protected primary pressure and became proLABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 413, 414, 428, 460 (1948)
[hereinafter cited LEG. HIST.]; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1947),
HISTORY OF THE

reprinted in I LEG. HIST. 547; 93 CONG. REc. 4131, 4138, 4837-38, 4843-44, 4958-59, 4865, 5005,

5011, 5014, 6445-46, 7537 (1947) reprintedin II LEG. HIST. 1055, 1068, 1354-55, 1364-65, 137073, 1383, 1479, 1491, 1497, 1544, 1654.
For an extensive discussion of the congressional treatment of secondary boycotts see,
National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 620-33 (1967). See also, Aaron, The
Labor Management Reporting and DisclosureAct of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1086 (1960); Cox,
The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the NLRA, 44 MINN. L. REv. 257 (1959); Cushman,
Secondary Boycotts and Taft-Hartley Law, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 109 (1954); Lesnick, Job
Security and Secondary Boycotts: The Reach of NLRA §§ 8(b)(4) and 8(e), 113 U. PA. L.
.REv. 1000 (1965); Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727 (1951).
12. The most widely accepted definition of a secondary boycott is probably that of Judge
Learned Hand:
The gravamen of a secondary boycott is that its sanctions bear, not upon the
employer who alone is a party to the dispute, but upon some third party who has
no concern in it. Its aim is to compel him to stop doing business with the employer
in the hope that this will induce the employer to give into his employees' demands.
International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950), aff'd, 341 U.S.
694 (1951).
13. Section 7 of the NLRA provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ...

29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 13 provides:
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike, or affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1970).
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hibited pressure with a secondary, illegal object.
The earliest cases under section 8(b)(4)(B) gave the statute a
nearly literal reading. Under this approach, if the union's activity

had the object of forcing an employer to coago doing busineg with
another, such an object was illegal and violative of the section regardless of whether the union's ultimate goal was permissible.
NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council'4 (Denver
Building Trades) exemplifies this approach. In that case, a general
contractor awarded a subcontract for electrical work to a nonunion
firm, Gould & Preisner. These employees were the only nonunion
men on the job. The employees of the general contractor, members
of a construction trades union, protested the presence of the nonunion men and picketed the jobsite. The only persons who reported
for work were the nonunion workers of Gould & Preisner. In response, the general contractor ordered Gould & Preisner off the job.
The union resumed work. Gould & Preisner filed charges with the
Board claiming the union had violated section 8(b)(4)(A). The Supreme Court accepted the Board's finding that an object of the
strike was to force the contractor to terminate his subcontract with
Gould & Preisner. A strike with such an object violated the section
even though the ultimate purpose of the union was lawful (organization of the jobsite).
Subsequent cases, however, moved away from the illegal-object
analysis of Denver Building Trades, recognizing that a too literal
reading of the statute would render the union's right to take concerted action meaningless since nearly all strikes result in the cessation of business for those who deal with the employer involved in
the labor dispute. What emerged was a primary/secondary dichotomy that focused on the objective of the union's activity. Where the
purpose of the union's conduct was primary, there was no violation;
the fact that the immediate employer might have to cease doing
business with another party to satisfy the union's demands was
regarded as an ancillary effect of the union's primary activity.
In theory this approach to the problem appears simple; in practice, however, it is difficult to apply. Separating permitted primary
activity from conduct prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B) has been
particularly difficult in the construction industry where unions have
sought to preserve jobsite work through enforcement of work preservation clauses in their collective bargaining agreements. In the typical work preservation case, the union representing employees of a
construction subcontractor will negotiate a work preservation agree14. 341 U.S. 675 (1951)0.

19781

NOTES

ment with that employer guaranteeing to the employees that all
work traditionally performed by them will be given to them. Subsequently, the subcontractor either orders prefabricated materials in
violation of his work preservation agreement or accepts a contract
with another that specifies the use of such materials. When the
prefabricated materials are delivered to the jobsite, the union refuses to handle the goods. The work stoppage usually results in a
complaint being issued against the union alleging violation of section 8(b)(4)(B).
To determine the legality of the refusal to handle prefabricated
goods, the Board has developed a "right-to-control" test. This test
determines the legality of the union's conduct by focusing on the
party upon whom the union's pressure is brought to bear. 5 If the
contractor with whom the union has a work preservation agreement
is the party with control over the assignment of the disputed work,
the work stoppage is presumptively legal. If, however, that employer
has no control over the assignment of the work, the strike is presumed to have been engaged in for an illegal purpose: forcing a
cessation of business with the party having the power to assign the
work. The subcontractor is viewed by the Board as the neutral party
in a dispute between the union and the employer who has the power
to award the work.
The courts of appeals 7 unanimously approved of the use of the
control test. Thus, in the work preservation cases, the Board and the
15. It does not matter whether the subcontractor knew when he placed his bid that the
contract called for the use of prefabricated materials. The Board's entire focus is on the
employer's control over the assignment of the work. Thus, the subcontractor can bid on a
project that specifies prefabricated materials and violate his work preservation agreement
with the union. If the decision to use the prefabricated materials was not the subcontractor's,
the union cannot take economic action to enforce the work preservation agreement without
violating § 8(b)(4)(B).
16. See, e.g., Local 1066, Longshoremen's Ass'n (Wiggins Terminals), 137 N.L.R.B. 45
(1962); Local 1694, International Longshoremen's Ass'n (Board of Harbour Commissioners)
137 N.L.R.B. 1178 (1962); Clifton Deangelo, 121 N.L.R.B. 676 (1958). The Board's control
doctrine has been described as follows:
That direct action against an immediate employer for the purpose of preserving
bargaining unit work constitutes an illegal secondary boycott when another person, with whom the immediate employer is in a contractual relation, has the
exclusive right to control the work.
Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor Antitrust, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 904, n.2 (1976).
17. American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 366 F.2d 815, 822 (8th Cir. 1966); National
Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 354 F.2d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 1965), rev'd on other grounds,
386 U.S. 612 (1967); NLRB v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 331 F.2d 712, 717 (3d Cir.
1964); Ohio Valley Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 339 F.2d 142, 145 (6th Cir. 1964); Local
5, Plumbers v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 721 (1963); NLRB
v. Enterprise Ass'n, Local 638, 285 F.2d 642, 645 (2d Cir. 1960).
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courts refused to consider a work preservation demand as being
primary activity if it were made on an employer who could not
assign the claimed work. Even though the stated purpose of the
union's action was to pressure the employer into giving the union
the work it demanded, the Board and courts looked beyond this and
focused on the party against whom the union was bringing the pressure to bear. This approach to section 8(b)(4)(B) was at odds with
the primary/secondary dichotomy that was emerging elsewhere in
secondary boycott law. The primary/secondary dichotomy was
based on the proposition that in enacting section 8(b)(4), Congress
had not intended to prevent the union from using economic pressure
to pursue primary goals. Consequently, unions could lawfully bring
such pressure and any secondary effects were regarded as incidental
and therefore lawful as long as the ultimate goal was permissible.,
Liability hinged on whether the purpose of the union's exertion of
pressure was lawful, not on the identity of the party against whom
the pressure was brought to bear. With the announcement in
National Woodwork of what appeared to be a new test for identifying unlawful secondary pressures,"9 a majority of the circuits reexamined the Board's control test and rejected it as failing to take
account of "all the surrounding circumstances" of the labor dispute.2
In National Woodwork, Frouge, a general contractor, was party
to a collective bargaining agreement which provided that the union
would not handle prefitted doors. Frouge, nonetheless, ordered premachined doors from a manufacturer. When the union refused to
hang the doors, Frouge cancelled his contract with the manufacturer
and ordered blank doors be delivered to the jobsite. An association
18. Note, Secondary Boycotts in the Construction Industry: Work Preservationand the
Right-to-Control, 7 SETON HALL L. REV. 659, 668 (1976). For an analysis of the primary/secondary dichotomy in the context of picketing see Lesnick, The Gravamen of the
Secondary Boycott, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1363 (1962).
19. The Supreme Court stated that the determination whether there had been a violation
of either sections 8(e) or 8(b)(4)(B) could not be made
without an inquiry into whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the
Union's objective was preservation of work for Frouge's employees, or whether the
agreements and boycott were tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives
elsewhere . . . . The touchstone is whether the agreement or its maintenance is
addressed to the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own
employees.
386 U.S. at 644-45 (footnotes omitted).
20. Western Monolithics Concrete Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1971);
Local 742, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 444 F.2d 895, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Beacon
Castle Square Bldg. Corp. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 188, 192 n.10 (1st Cir. 1969) (dictum); NLRB
v. Local 164, IBEW, 388 F.2d 105, 109-10 (3d Cir. 1968); American Boiler Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NLRB, 404 F.2d 556, 561-62 (8th Cir. 1968).
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of prefabricated door manufacturers filed charges with the Board
alleging that the union's actions in enforcing the work preservation
agreement had violated sections 8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. 2'
The Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that section 8(e)
did not ban the work preservation agreement and that its enforce22
ment by the union had not violated section 8(b)(4)(B).
Had the Court followed the illegal-object approach of Denver
Building Trades,231 there would have been an unfair labor practice
since the union's activities necessarily involved forcing Frouge to
cease doing business with the manufacturer of the prefitted doors. 24
Instead, the Court focused on the goal of the union and asked:
"[Wihether, under all the surrounding circumstances, the Union's
objective was preservation of work for Frouge's employees, or
whether the agreement and boycott were tactically calculated to
satisfy union objectives elsewhere. ' '15 In reviewing the record, the
21. Section 8(e) provides:
(e) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such
employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from.handling, using,
selling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other
employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or
agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall
be to such extent unenforcible and void; Provided, That nothing in this subsection
shall apply to an agreement between a labor organization and an employer in the
construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building,
structure, or other work ....
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1970). Section 8(e) was added to the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments.
The legislative history surrounding its enactment indicates the section was intended to close
a loophole perceived to have been created by Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB,
357 U.S. 93 (1958). Under the Court's construction of section 8(b)(4)(A), contractual agreements having secondary objectives were not unlawful although efforts to enforce such agreements by secondary pressure constituted a violation. Congress responded with section 8(e)
and made it an unfair labor practice for an employer and labor organization to agree to cease
to handle the goods of another. The construction given to section 8(e) by the Court in National
Woodwork limited its prohibition to secondary boycott agreements. The section did not
prohibit agreements with primary objectives; work preservation was held a primary objective.
22. 386 U.S. at 646.
The Court observed that the union had not sought review of the three cases in which the
Board had found unfair labor practices where the owners of the construction projects had
specified that the contractors should furnish and install prefabricated doors. Thus, the
Board's right-to-control test was not an issue before the Court. 386 U.S. at 615 n.3.
23. 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
24. The dissent would have found a violation of the Act based on Denver Building
Trades. Justice Stewart criticized the Court's conclusion that the union's conduct was outside
section 8(b)(4)(B) because its ultimate purpose was primary. Since "an object" of the work
stoppage was to prevent Frouge from using prefabricated doors, thereby forcing him to cease
doing business with the manufacturer of those doors, the union violated section 8(b)(4)(B).
386 U.S. at 650-52.
25. Id. at 644-45 (footnote omitted).
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Court concluded there was substantial evidence to support the
Board's finding that the union's goal was preservation of work for
Frouge's employees and was not "tactically calculated to satisfy
union objectives elsewhere." The fact that the union's success would
force Frouge to cease doing business with the manufacturer of the
prefitted doors was an ancillary effect of the union's work stoppage
and not a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B).
Although right-to-control was not an issue in National
Woodwork,2" the circuits began to reject the control test (and the
Denver Building Trades illegal-object analysis on which it was
premised) and focused instead on the union's ultimate purpose.27
These circuits concluded that where the union had negotiated a
valid work preservation agreement with an employer and the sole
objective of the union's action was to enforce that agreement, the
union's activity was primary. The fact that the employer lacked the
power to assign the work did not transform such activity into prohibited secondary action.
Despite its rejection by a majority of the circuits, the Board
continued to adhere to the control test. In Local 438, Plumbers
(George Koch Sons, Inc.)," the Board distinguished the right-tocontrol cases from National Woodwork and explained its continued
reliance on the test to determine secondary pressure. Koch, a general contractor, had agreed to furnish to the General Electric Company machinery to be used in that company's manufacturing process. Koch's contract required that a portion of the piping to be used
in the system be pretested. This portion of the piping work was
performed by Koch's employees at his factory. 9 The rest of the work
of installing the pipes was subcontracted to Phillips Co., who was
party to a work preservation agreement with Local 438, a pipefitter's

union.'" Koch delivered both the pipe he had fabricated for the tests
and the nonfabricated pipe to the jobsite. The union refused to
install the 'fabricated pipe claiming that the pipe violated its work
preservation clause.'
26. Note 22 supra.
27. A more basic failing of the "right to control" test under National Woodwork is that it focuses on entirely the wrong set of circumstances. It is concerned solely with which party presently has the power to satisfy the union's
objective, rather than focusing on the substance of the objective itself. Thus it
misses the point of the primary-secondary dichotomy as set forth in National
Woodwork.
444 F.2d 895, 900-01 (1971)(footnote omitted).
28. 201 N.L.R.B. 59, enforced, 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973).
29. Id. at 59-60.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 60.
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The Board found the work preservation clause was valid under
section 8(e) but that union pressure brought to enforce it violated
section 8(b)(4)(B). In reaching this decision the Board distinguished
National Woodwork on the basis that Frouge had been the party
who had made the decision to use prefabricated materials and thus
had the power to resolve the dispute by assigning the work to the
union. This was a "crucial factual difference" and therefore
"rendered National Woodwork not dispositive of the situation"
where the subcontractor lacked the power to assign the work.32 Because of the Board's continued insistence on use of the control test,
and the split within the circuits as to whether that test was valid,
the Supreme Court in Enterprise was faced squarely with the issue
it had not been called upon to decide in National Woodwork:
whether a union violates section 8(b)(4)(B) when it seeks to enforce
a valid work preservation agreement against an employer who does
not have control over the assignment of work sought by the union.3
THE MAJORITY OPINION

A majority of the Court resolved the issue in favor of the
Board's continued use of its control test. The Court did so by treating the Board's conclusion that union activity is secondary where
brought to bear on an employer without power to assign the work
as a factual finding supported by substantial evidence rather than
as a legal standard for determining secondary pressure.
The Court dealt first with the proposition that since work preservation agreements are primary, action undertaken to enforce such
an agreement is also primary and therefore an adequate defense to
a section 8(b)(4)(B) charge. This argument was rejected as inconsistent with the Court's holding in Local 1976, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters v. NLRB (Sand Door).3' The issue before the Court
in Sand Door was whether a clause in a collective bargaining agreement which provided that employees would not be required to handle nonunion material could be a defense to a section 8(b)(4)(B)
charge. The Court held that even though that section did not prohibit agreements between an employer and union to boycott the
32. Id. at 61. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the Board's order. George Koch Sons, Inc. v.
NLRB, 490 F.2d 323 (4th Cir. 1973). The court agreed with the Board that National
Woodwork was distinguishable on the basis of the employer's control over the work. By
focusing on the union's pressure rather than its objective, the court concluded that if "a
result" of the pressure was to force the subcontractor to cease doing business with the general
contractor, then enforcement of the work preservation agreement violated section 8(b)(4)(B).
490 F.2d at 328.
33. 429 U.S. 507 (1977).
34. 357 U.S. 93 (1958).
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products of another, the agreement could not be enforced by secondary pressure without violating section 8(b)(4)(B).35 In Enterprise,
the majority used the reasoning of Sand Door to hold that
"[s]ection 8(e) does not prohibit agreements made for 'primary'
purposes, including the purpose of pfeserving for the contracting
employees themselves work traditionally done by them."3 The fact
that the agreement is for a primary purpose, however, does not
make action to enforce the agreement also primary."
In reaching this result the majority appears to have returned to
the illegal-object analysis of Denver Building Trades and that decision's emphasis on the target of the union's pressure rather than the
union's purpose for using economic pressure against an employer.
Thus, the fact that the union's purpose in refusing to handle prefabricated materials is primary (enforcement of a valid work preservation agreement), does not exempt its actions from section
8(b)(4)(B). Instead, the Court looks to the parties affected by the
union's refusal to work. In Enterprise, the Court concluded that
since the union could not obtain the work by exerting pressure on
Hudik alone, its actions necessarily were directed at exerting pressure on Austin as well. The inclusion of Austin as a target of the
union's pressure violated section 8(b)(4)(B). 5
The Court also rejected the court of appeals' claim that the
Board's control test "is invalid as a matter of law because it fails to
comply with the National Woodwork standard that the union's conduct be judged in light of all the relevant circumstances."3' 9 The
court of appeals had erroneously interpreted the holding in
National Woodwork. The Court had not announced a new legal
standard for identifying secondary pressure ° but had simply sustained the Board's findings as supported by substantial evidence.
Moreover, the record in Enterprise contained no evidence that the
35. Id. at 108.
36. 429 U.S. at 517.
37. The dissent would hold otherwise: "[I]f a contract clause is intended to preserve
work, its objective, and the objective of pressure to enforce it, is primary, and therefore
legitimate." Id. at 536.
38. The majority in sustaining the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice concluded:
That the union may also have been seeking to enforce its contract and to convince
Hudik that it should bid on no more jobs where prepiped units were specified does
not alter the fact that the union refused to install the Slant/Fin units and asserted
that the piping work on the Norwegian Home job belonged to its members . . ..
[Tihe union's objectives were not confined to the employment relationship with
Hudik but included the object of influencing Austin in a manner prohibited by
section 8(b)(4)(B).
Id. at 530-31.
39. Id. at 521.
40. Id. at 522.
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Board, in using its control test, failed to consider all of the relevant
circumstances surrounding the union's refusal to handle the prefabricated pipe. The fact-that the Board distinguished between
two cases on the basis of an employer's control over the disputed
work demonstrated to the Court that the Board was following the
National Woodwork test.4
The Court further noted that since 1958, the Board has consistently interpreted and applied section 8(b)(4)(B) to find an unfair
labor practice "where the union employs a product boycott to claim
work that the immediate employer is not in a position to award, and
it has declined to find a violation where the employer has such
power.' 42 Thus the Board's interpretation of the statute having been
long established and undisturbed by Congress, is entitled to deference by the Court. As the majority read the record, there was substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that "the union's
objectives were not confined to the employment relationship with
Hudik but included the object of influencing Austin in a manner
prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(B).'''
THE DISSENT

The dissenters would have held the union's conduct to be lawful
primary activity based on their understanding of the Court's decision in National Woodwork. In their opinion, that decision held that
work preservation was a primary objective; consequently, union action undertaken for that purpose was necessarily primary. Thus, the
Board's finding that the union's refusal "was based on a valid workpreservation clause in the agreement with Hudik

. .

. and was for

the purpose of preserving work [the union's members] had traditionally performed,"" required the conclusion that its conduct was
primary activity.
The dissent sharply criticized the Court's treatment of the
right-to-control test as a factual finding by the Board to be treated
with deference.45 They viewed the union's action if taken for the
41. Justice White stated: "[Tlhe Board may assign to the presence or absence of control
much more weight than would the Court of Appeals, but this far from demonstrates a departure from the totality-of-the-circumstances test recognized in National Woodwork." Id. at
524.
42. Id. at 576 (footnotes omitted).
43. Id. at 531.
44. Id.at 533.
45. [Olnce the Board determined that the Union's object was preservation
of work its members had traditionally performed for Hudik, its factfinding task
was completed. The Board concluded that despite this finding, Austin's "right to
control" the disputed work required the conclusion that Austin was the Union's
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purpose of enforcing a valid work preservation clause as necessarily
primary and hence not a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B). The Board
erred as a matter of law when, having found as a fact that the
union's action was for work preservation, it went on to hold that
Austin's control over the work required the conclusion that Austin
was the real object of the union's pressure.
The dissent rejected the Court's assertion that Enterprise was
distinguishable from National Woodwork on the basis of the employer's control. They regarded the dispute in both cases to be over
the application of a work preservation clause to the use of prefabricated materials in the construction industry. The fact that Austin,
and not Hudik, had "control" over assignment of the work did not
alter the nature of the dispute or the union's claim.
The majority's characterization of Hudik as a neutral party
warranting protection was called erroneous. Hudik had accepted the
subcontract in violation of his work preservation agreement and
should, therefore, have to deal with the union's pressure to enforce
it. The dissent refused to accept the majority's contention that
Hudik was powerless to deal with the union's demands:
As the Court of Appeals pointed out, if the Union's purpose is
truly work preservation for the benefit of its own members, it
presumably would be willing to negotiate some substitute for full
compliance . . . . Nothing in this record indicates that Hudik
made any attempt to reach that or any other compromise solution, and there is no reason to think 6 that the Union would not
have been satisfied with such result.
Since the union's grievance was over the preservation of work
traditionally performed by the bargaining unit, their dispute was
with Hudik and no one else. The dissent would only have considered
Austin as a target if there was evidence that the union represented
employees of Austin or was engaged in a general effort to prevent
Austin from using prefabricated pipes. Absent such evidence, it was
error to conclude that Austin was the target of the union's pressure
simply because he had control over assignment of the work.
There was also disagreement with the majority's reliance on
Sand Door. In the dissent's view, Sand Door was precedent only for
the holding that pressure to enforce a secondary boycott clause remains secondary despite the fact that at the time the pressure was
taken the agreement itself was lawful. The disputed clause in Sand
target. This was an error of law, not a factual finding.

Id. at 540.
46. Id. at 538-39.
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Door provided that "workmen shall not be required to handle nonunion material."47 Although the Court found nothing in the Act that
would prohibit this kind of hot cargo clause, the fact that the agreement was not prohibited did not render secondary pressure to enforce it lawful.48
The contract in Sand Door was an agreement to engage in a
secondary boycott. The agreement itself would be unlawful today
under section 8(e). The clause at issue in Enterprise was primary,
not secondary. Consequently, the latter case stands only for the
principle that secondary pressure cannot be transformed into primary pressure simply because an employer's agreement to support
the boycott is not unlawful. Work preservation cases present an
entirely different situation. National Woodwork held that work
preservation is a primary objective and that work preservation
clauses are valid primary agreements under section 8(e). The dissent concluded that any action to enforce a work preservation
agreement is presumed to have as its objective work preservation
and is, therefore, primary pressure and not a violation of section 8
(b)(4)(B). It is apparent that the dissent's emphasis is on the purpose of the union's pressure. Where that purpose is primary there
is no violation of section 8(b)(4)(B) and the employer's lack of control over the assignment of the work does not change this result.
The disagreement between the majority and dissent is fundamental. The dissent would treat union activity with a work preservation objective as primary as a matter of law. If the record demonstrates that the sole purpose of the union is enforcement of a valid
work preservation agreement, then its actions are beyond the reach
of section 8(b)(4)(B) regardless of their effect on other employers
who deal with the immediate employer. Although the majority
would agree that work preservation agreements are primary (not
prohibited by section 8(e)), they do not reach the dissent's conclusion that union activity with a work preservation objective is therefore primary. Instead, the majority's focus is on the target of the
union's pressure in pursuing its work preservation goals. Where that
pressure is directed at a party other than the union's immediate
employer, the pressure is secondary and prohibited by section
8(b)(4)(B). Thus, in the situation where the decision to assign the
work lies with a person other than the employer who is party to the
47. 357 U.S. at 95.
48. 429 U.S. at 541-42. In the 1958 amendments to the NLRA, Congress responded to

the holding in Sand Door by outlawing "hot cargo" agreements: section 8(e)makes it an
unfair labor practice for a union and an employer to enter an agreement to boycott the
products of another employer.
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work preservation agreement, the inference can be made that the
union's activity is directed at influencing the party with control over
the work. The result is the union cannot engage in strike action to
enforce a work preservation agreement against an employer who
lacks control over the work.
Enterprise AND THE PRIMARY/SECONDARY DICHOTOMY
The Enterprise decision cannot be fitted into the primary/
secondary framework that the Court has developed for identifying
unlawful secondary activity. That analysis typically involved the
Board and Court in a labeling process. Who was the party against
whom the pressure was being directed? Where that party was the
primary party in the labor dispute, the union's conduct was protected since the purpose of section 8(b)(4)(B) is to protect neutral
parties in labor disputes. 9 In the right-to-control cases the Board
considers the subcontractor to be a neutral when he is struck by his
employees to obtain work over which he has no control. The union's
real dispute is with the employer who can assign the work. Does this
make the employer with control the primary employer? The Board
in Bricklayers' & Stone Masons' Union, Local 8 (CaliforniaConcrete
Systems) ° answered this question in the affirmative and held that
the union did not commit an unfair labor practice when it threatened to picket the general contractor in a work preservation dispute.
A brief discussion of CaliforniaConcrete Systems will illustrate the
confusion that is created when there is an attempt to label the
employers in a right-to-control strike as either neutral or primary.
West Valley and Nesbit were two masonry subcontractors who
had negotiated a contract with Local 8 which stated that construction of fireplaces was unit work. The agreement would allow the
union to refuse to permit bricklayers to handle prefabricated masonry fireplaces. West Valley and Nesbit accepted a contract with
Besco that specified the use of prefabricated fireplaces. The use of
these fireplaces violated the work preservation agreement with
Local 8. Local 8 then instituted charges against union members who
were employees of West Valley and Nesbit for installing the prefabricated fireplaces after being told not to by the union. The employees were each fined $500. The union also informed Besco that
if he did not cease using prefabricated fireplaces then the union
49. The Supreme Court has defined the central concept of section 8(b)(4) as a prohibition of "union pressure directed at a neutral employer the object of which [is] to induce or
coerce him to cease doing business with an employer (the primary) with whom the union [is]
engaged in a labor dispute." 386 U.S. at 622.
50. 180 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 72 L.R.R.M. 1612 (1969).
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would picket the entire project and bring construction to a halt.
These actions by the union resulted in charges of unfair labor practices against Local 8 by California Concrete, the manufacturer of
the prefabricated fireplaces. The Board found that the union's actions in fining the employees of West Valley and Nesbit violated
sections 8(B)(4)(i) and (ii)(B). However, the Board found that there
had been no violation of the section with regard to the threat against
Besco. The Board held that the union had a right to coerce Besco
to stop doing business with California Concrete because its goal of
work preservation was primary and Besco was the employer with
control over the work. Thus, the employers who were parties to the
work preservation agreement and their employees were neutral parties in the labor dispute and action directed against them would
violate section 8(b)(4)(B). Yet an employer outside the collective
bargaining relationship was treated by the Board as the primary
employer because he had control over the claimed work and union
action directed at him was protected by the Act.
The Ninth Circuit refused to accept the Board's decision and
set aside the portion of the Board's decision which held that the
union did not commit an unfair labor practice when it threatened
to picket Besco.' This decision points to the confusion inherent in
attempts to label the employers in the right-to-control cases. The
Ninth Circuit observed that:
The union's complaint here was clearly with West Valley and
Nesbit who agreed to the work preservation clause. Its attempts
to force them to stop doing business with Besco were lawful primary activity aimed at work preservation. However, when it expanded its attack to a threat to Besco it extended the controversy
to a protected neutral .... 11
Finding that Besco was a protected neutral and therefore the
union's actions directed at him were secondary, the Ninth Circuit
rejected the Board's decision that there had been no-unfair labor
practice. It further indicated that West Valley and Nesbit were
primary employers and that the union's action against the subcontractors' employees was primary. Yet the Board had held that West
Valley and Nesbit's lack of control over the work made them neutral
employers and that the union had violated section 8(b)(4)(B) when
it fined their employees. The court bypassed these inconsistencies,
observing that since the "remainder of the Board's findings are not
on review [they] . . . remain undisturbed."" What is apparent
51. Western Monolithics Concrete Prod., Inc. v. NLRB, 446 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1971).
52. Id. at 527.
53. Id.
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from these two opinions is that the traditional labels of primary and
secondary employer do not fit the right-to-control cases. It is
difficult to accept as neutral an employer who has negotiated a work
preservation agreement with a union representing his employees.
The fact that he has accepted work from a contractor that causes
him to breach his collective bargaining agreement with the union
does not mean that he is "uninvolved" in the union's demand that
it not lose work it has traditionally performed. Moreover, the general contractor, outside the collective bargaining relationship, has
not promised the union that its work will be preserved. Yet he is the
employer who has the decision whether or not to assign the work to
the union. Does this control make him a primary employer? If so,
could the union bring pressure against him alone? The Ninth Circuit in California Concrete Systems said no. The Court in Enterprise avoided the issue by declining to label Austin as a primary
employer although the administrative law judge had found that
both Austin and Slant/Fin were primary employers.54
WORK PRESERVATION AGREEMENTS OUTSIDE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS

In light of the Court's decision in Connell Construction Co. v.

Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,11 it is doubtful that the union
could use economic pressure against an employer outside the collective bargaining relationship without risking liability under the antitrust laws. In that decision, the Court held that an agreement which
was outside the context of a collective bargaining relationship was
neither authorized by section 8(e) nor entitled to the nonstatutory
exemption recognized in Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.56 The
54. 429 U.S. at 513-14. The administrative law judge had concluded that Austin and
Slant/Fin were primary employers. The Board did not adopt this part of his report. 204
N.L.R.B. at 764.
55. 421 U.S. 616 (1974).
56. 381 U.S. 676 (1965). The Court described the development of the nonstatutory exemption

as follows:

The basic sources of organized labor's exemption from federal antitrust laws
are §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 and 738, 15 U.S.C. § 17 and 29
U.S.C. § 52, and the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, and 73, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 104, 105, and 113. These statutes declare that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, and exempt specific union activities,
including secondary picketing and boycotts, from the operation of the antitrust
laws. See United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1941). They do not exempt
concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties. United
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965). The Court has recognized,
however, that a-proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring
collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional policy favoring free
competition in business markets requires that some union-employer agreements
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agreement could, therefore, be the basis for an antitrust suit.
The union in Connell sought to organize mechanical subcontractors (a primary objective) by exerting economic pressure against
the general contractor to secure an agreement from him to subcontract mechanical work only to firms with a collective bargaining
agreement with the union (Local 100). Local 100 did not represent
any of the employees of Connell nor was it seeking to organize them.
Connell, the general contractor, signed the agreement under protest.
Subsequently, he brought suit against the union alleging that the
agreement violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.5"
Local 100 argued that the construction proviso to section 8(e)
authorized the contract since it was an "agreement between a labor
organization and an employer relating to contracting or subcontracting work to be done at the jobsite."55 Despite the broad language of the proviso, the Court rejected this argument and held that
Congress intended only to allow subcontracting agreements within
the context of a collective bargaining relationship. Such a relationship was wholly lacking since Local 100 did not represent any of
Connell's employees and had disclaimed all interest in organizing
them. Because the agreement was not authorized by section 8(e), it
did not have the protection of the NLRA. The Court further determined that the agreement involved direct restraints5" on the business market to a degree not justified by the union's interest in organizing the mechanical subcontractors. Consequently, the agreement
was not entitled to the nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions.
be accorded a limited nonstatutory exemption from antitrust sanctions. Meat
Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
421 U.S. at 621-22.
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2.
58. 421 U.S. at 626.
59. There were three aspects of the union's activities that the Court emphasized in
characterizing them as "direct restraints on the business market." First, the agreement with
Connell and other general contractors would exclude nonunion subcontractors from the market even though they might have competitive advantages based on more efficient operating
methods unrelated to wages and employees' working conditions. Secondly, Local 100 and an
association of mechanical subcontractors had entered into a collective bargaining agreement
that contained a "most-favored nation clause." This clause gave members of the association
the contractual right to insist on terms as favorable as those given any competitor and
guaranteed that the union would not make an agreement with an unaffiliated contractor that
put members at a competitive disadvantage. The Court perceived that the effect of the clause
was to shelter association members from outside competition in that portion of the market
covered by a subcontracting agreement between the general contractor and Local 100. Lastly,
the agreement with the general contractor did not simply prohibit subcontracting work to
nonunion mechanical contractors but also prohibited subcontracting to firms who were not
represented by Local 100. This in effect would give Local 100 monopolistic control over
mechanical subcontracting work in its geographical jurisdiction. 421 U.S. at 624.
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This nonstatutory exemption had evolved from the Court's decision in United States v. Hutcheson0 that unions are exempt from
antitrust prosecution only so long as they are acting only in their
self-interest. The Court recognized that this holding seriously
threatened the existence of collective bargaining. Consequently, the
Court has exempted collective bargaining agreements from the antitrust laws where those agreements are concerned with eliminating
competition over wages, hours and like terms of employment, despite the anticompetitive effects of these agreements. In Jewel Tea,
a nonstatutory exemption was announced that attempts to effectuate labor policies favoring the elimination of competition over
wages, hours and other conditions of employment, without allowing
these agreements to severely restrain product market competition.
At issue in Jewel Tea was the legality of a provision in the
collective bargaining agreement that barred retail stores in the Chicago area from selling fresh meat at night or on Sundays. Jewel Tea
Company, a large retail food store, challenged the provision under
the Sherman Act alleging that the restriction on marketing hours
was an illegal restraint prohibited by section 1. Jewel Tea argued
that one group of employers, the independent store owners, had
favored this provision in the contract negotiations and had thereby
conspired with the union to obtain the provision. The Supreme
Court held that the restriction on marketing hours was intimately
related to the union's interests in protecting the working conditions
of its members. Although the limitation on marketing hours might
adversely affect the competitive positions between retail food stores
and the independent stores, these effects were ancillary to the
union's interest in securing uniform working conditions for its members."1 The problem is thus one of distinguishing between labor
agreements properly concerned with wages, hours and like terms of
employment and those in which collective bargaining is used to
achieve forbidden restraints in the product market.2
60. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
61. The marketing restriction in Jewel Tea denied Jewel Tea Company the competitive
advantage it otherwise would have had since it was prevented from using its meat packaging
system to sell meat in the evening hours and on Sundays. See 381 U.S. at 681-82.
62. UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) is an example of the latter. When Phillips
Brothers Coal Co., a small mining partnership, was sued by trustees of the UMW for royalties
due under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, Phillips counterclaimed alleging
that the UMW and its trustees had conspired with several large mine operators in violation
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Although the Supreme Court reversed the judgment
against UMW, it did so on the basis of improper admission of evidence. The Court rejected
the union's argument that it was wholly exempt from the antitrust laws and held that where
allegations had been made that the union had conspired with large coal miners to drive small
operators out of the market, "any claim to exemption from antitrust liability is frivolous at
best." Id. at 633.
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The Court has used a balancing test to determine whether the
agreement is entitled to the exemption: the union's interest in securing uniform working conditions through collective bargaining agreements is weighed against the agreement's relative impact on the
product market. In Jewel Tea, the Court struck the balance in the
union's favor and held that the clause restricting marketing hours
was "intimately related" to legitimate union concerns. Thus, the
impact on the product market was outweighed by the employees'
interest in their own labor standards. In Connell, however, the balance was struck against the union and the agreement was held not
to be within the nonstatutory exemption. Of particular concern to
the Court was the fact that the agreements with Connell indiscriminately excluded nonunion subcontractors from a portion of the market even though their competitive advantage might be derived from
more efficient operating methods and. not from substandard wages
or working conditions. 3 The effect of the agreement was to impose
direct restraints on the business market that the Court felt would
not follow naturally from the elimination of competition over wages
and working conditions. The agreement "contravenes antitrust policies to a degree not justified by congressional labor policy, and
therefore cannot claim a nonstatutory exemption from the antitrust
laws." 4
The Court's holding in National Woodwork that work preservation agreements are primary and not violative of section 8(e) has
allowed unions to secure these agreements with subcontractors free
from antitrust liability. However, were the union to enter into a
work. preservation agreement with an employer outside the collective bargaining relationship (the general contractor in the right-tocontrol situation), it is probable that under Connell such an agreement would not be authorized by section 8(e) and the union would
be potentially liable for treble damages under the antitrust laws.
The Court would have to decide whether work preservation agreements not authorized by section 8(e) are entitled to the nonstatutory exemption." The Court in National Woodwork took note of the
63. 421 U.S. at 623.
64. Id. at 625. Since neither the district court nor the court of appeals had decided
whether the agreement between Local 100 and Connell, if subject to the antitrust laws, would
constitute an agreement that restrains trade within the meaning of the Sherman Act, the case
was remanded to the district court for consideration whether the agreement violated the
antitrust laws. Id. at 637.
65. Section 8(e) only prohibits actual agreements between the union and employer.
Thus, union action to secure or enforce boycott agreements must be judged under section
8(b)(4)(B). Union action directed against a primary employer has always been primary. Had
the Court found Austin to be a primary employer, it would have' meant that unions could
use economic pressure to obtain work preservation agreements from an employer outside the
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threat posed to union job security by the introduction of prefabricated materials onto the jobsite. The Court concluded that, absent
clear evidence of congressional intent to the contrary, section 8(e)
should not be construed to remove from the collective bargaining
process the task of adjusting job security to technological progress. 5
The role of collective bargaining as a means for resolving work preservation disputes would be drastically undercut if the Court were

forced to decide whether work preservation agreements are entitled
to the nonstatutory exemption. A decison that the agreements are
not entitled to an exemption would in effect prohibit these agreements since the unions would not risk the costs of treble damage
antitrust suits. 7 Yet, given the substantial impact that work preservation agreements have in foreclosing prefabricated materials from
the contruction industry, there is a strong countervailing argument
that this restraint cannot be justified where the work preservation
agreement is outside the collective bargaining relationship. The
basis for the nonstatutory exemption is a recognition by the Court
that the labor laws reflect a national policy that favors elimination
of competition over wages through collective bargaining. Absent a
collective bargaining relationship the nonstatutory exemption
should not be allowed. Consequently, a work preservation agreement between a union and an employer who is not organized by the
union (the general contractor in the right-to-control dispute) would
be subject to antitrust liability.
This antitrust problem raised by an attempt to label the general contractor a primary employer in a right-to-control dispute
perhaps explains the Court's refusal to label Austin as the primary
employer. In so refusing, the Court departed from the primary/secondary analysis developed in previous cases. This analysis
required identification of two parties: the primary employer, with
whom the union has its dispute and the secondary employer, not
involved in the labor dispute but brought into the conflict in order
to damage the primary employer through a loss of business.
Enterprise cannot be fit into this analysis; the subcontractor who is
collective bargaining relationship but with control over the claimed work. Once the agreement
was obtained, however, there would be potential antitrust liability since the agreement would
not be authorized by section 8(e) in the absence of a collective bargaining relationship between the union and the employer with control.
66. 386 U.S. at 640-42.
67. Once it is determined the agreement is not exempt, the Court then must answer the
question whether the agreement has in fact acted as a restraint on the product market. There
is ample evidence that the effect of a work preservation agreement is to foreclose prefabricated materials from competing for use in jobsite construction. See, e.g., 429 U.S. at 524 n.12.
This would be a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
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party to a work preservation agreement with the union ceases to be
a primary employer when he loses control over assignment of the
claimed work and becomes a neutral party in a dispute not his own.
ANTITRUST PROBLEMS INHERENT IN WORK PRESERVATION DISPUTES

Who is the primary employer is left unanswered. The implication is that in a right-to-control case there is no primary employer.
Had the Court adopted the dissent's position, Enterprise would fit
neatly into the primary/secondary framework. Hudik-Ross, the subcontractor, would be the primary employer and the union's action
to enforce its work preservation agreement with Hudik-Ross would
have been primary, lawful activity. Instead, the majority accepted
the Board's finding that the union's dispute was not with HudikRoss despite the fact that Hudik-Ross was the employer who was a
party to the work preservation agreement and the union's refusal to
work was taken for the purpose of enforcing that agreement. Although the majority decision is inconsistent with the secondary boycott law that has developed, there is justification for this inconsistency in the serious antitrust problems that would have been generated by a decision that would allow union enforcement of work
preservation agreements against an employer lacking control over
the disputed work. In order to understand the nature of these antitrust problems it is necessary to consider the factual context of the
union's refusal to handle the Slant/Fin units.
The Court in a footnote to its opinion observed that the Board
had adopted the administrative law judge's discussion of the economic context in which the dispute arose. The administrative law
judge was of the opinion that union pressure on Austin and other
contractors who preferred factory piped units could effectively foreclose Slant/Fin and similar producers from the market:
It is an appropriate subject of official notice that in New York
City and probably in all or most of the major cities in this country, the building and construction industry is unionized, certainly
with respect to major industrial, commercial and public construction. Unionized in this context means that . . . the unions
are the source of labor supply and furnish employees to the
employer-contractors . . . . In the construction industry it is the
unions that control the labor supply and if the union steamfitter
employees of Hudik on the Norwegian job refuse to work, other
steamfitters will not be available to Hudik or to anyone else to
perform on the job . . . . If prepaid units cannot be installed in
the large commercial, public and industrial buildings in the New
York area and other areas effectively organized by the Union, and
other building trade unions, the manufacturer will be materially
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affected and Austin and other engineers and general contractors
will not specify their purchase and use in buildings."8
What the Court has described is the way in which work preservation
agreements are used by labor unions to keep prefabricated materials
off the jobsite. Even though these observations are confined to a
footnote, it is apparent that the Court was disturbed by the effectiveness of these agreements in keeping prefabricated materials
from competing in the construction industry. Significantly, the
Court reached a decision that makes it an unfair labor practice to
attempt enforcement of the agreement against an employer who
lacks control over the claimed work. The remainder of this note will
analyze the Court's decision in light of its observations on the structure of the construction industry. It will explain why the Court
departed from the established primary/secondary analysis to reach
its holding that a secondary intent can properly be inferred when
unions attempt enforcement of work preservation agreements
against employers without control over the work.
In the usual work preservation situation, the union and employer can be expected to bargain for their respective interests:
automation versus job security. But in the construction industry, a
general contractor usually subcontracts out the majority of the work
to subcontractors. It is the subcontractor that is organized by the
craft unions. Consequently, the subcontractor is the party with
whom the union negotiates the work preservation agreement. However, in the right-to-control case, the general contractor is the party
who has specified use of materials that eliminate union work. It will
be recalled that in National Woodwork the Court placed particular
emphasis on the importance of resolving the conflict between technological progress and job security through collective bargaining. 9
In National Woodwork, the general contractor was party to the work
preservation agreement with the carpenter's union. When Frouge
ordered premachined doors, he violated the collective bargaining
agreement. The union refused to handle the doors and Frouge was
faced with the choice of continuing to use the premachined doors
and thereby incurring the costs imposed by the work stoppage, or
complying with the union's demand, thus foregoing the benefits to
be gained from use of the premachined doors. Obviously, the choice
depended largely on the union's ability to withhold the supply of
labor until its demands were met.
In the right-to-control situation, the collective bargaining pro68. 429 U.S. at 524.
69. See text accompanying notes 17-27 supra.
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cess cannot function properly. The lack of a collective bargaining
relationship between the general contractor and the union means
that the union's original demand for preservation of work has not
been agreed to by the general contractor, nor can their present differences over use of prefabricated materials be resolved through the
collective bargaining process. Hence, there is less support in national labor policy for the work preservation agreement in a rightto-control dispute. Moreover, the anticompetitive effects of the
work preservation agreement are substantial, particularly where the
union has organized all of the subcontractors in a geographic area
and as a result has a monopoly over the supply of labor. In this
situation, the union has in effect put together a cartel of subcontractors and is using the work preservation agreement as a means of
policing the cartel. The facts as given in the Court's footnote in
Enterprisedescribe just this situation. The union's success in preserving work for its members will be directly dependent on its ability to effectively maintain its cartel of subcontractors:
If a pipefitter's union can secure the agreement of all plumbing subcontractors in a relevant geographic market to refuse to
bid on construction subcontracts that fail to bestow upon the
subcontractors all the pipefitter's traditional work, then any general contractor wishing to do business in that market must either
grant the plumbing subcontractor the demanded jobsite work or
face the prospect of having no craftsmen to do skilled plumbing
work that cannot be prefabricated."
In order to be successful, the union must have the cooperation
of all of the subcontractors in the area since prefabricated materials
are generally lower cost materials than those fabricated on the jobsite. A subcontractor who bid on a contract that did not preserve
work would have a competitive advantage over the other subcontractors since his bid would be at a lower absolute price. This would
seriously threaten the cohesiveness of the cartel. Work preservation
agreements have afforded the union the means of securing the subcontractors' compliance. The subcontractor who bids on a project
that does not preserve union work breaches his work preservation
agreement and is faced with a union work stoppage. Where the
union controls the labor supply, the subcontractor will not be able
to find substitutes to do the work. If the subcontractor knows that
the union can enforce the work preservation agreement, and thereby
force him off the project, he will be reluctant to bid on those pro70. Leslie, Right to Control: A Study in Secondary Boycotts and Labor Antitrust, 89
HARV. L. REv. 904, 908 (1976).
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jects. The right-to-control strike is the union's means of enforcing
its cartel.
In the right-to-control situation, general contractors' forebearance from using prefabricated goods is not merely the inevitable byproduct of the union's success in its dispute with the
subcontractor. The very purpose of the work stoppage is to police
a cartel which in turn will coerce general contractors, as a class,
to give up prefabricated goods. Moreover, the coercion of the
general contractor is essential to the causal chain whereby the
union attains its ultimate end of work preservation; the union will
succeed only if the general contractors are compelled by the
threat of a collective refusal to supply jobsite services, to exercise
their discretion by foregoing prefabricated materials."'
The Court in Enterprise has broken this causal chain. The
union cannot use its work preservation agreement with the subcontractor as a means of coercing the general contractor to forego the
use of prefabricated materials. The Court reached this result by
treating the Board's control test as a factual finding supported by
substantial evidence. In the right-to-control situation, it would be
fair to assume that the Board will always be able to infer from the
union's pressure on an employer unable to satisfy its demands that
the union has the illegal object of coercing the employer who does
have control over the work. Where this employer is not party to the
collective bargaining agreement preserving the union work, there
will be a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B). Thus the Court has significantly limited the union's ability to keep prefabricated materials
out of the building trades market through the use of a product
boycott.
WORK PRESERVATION AGREEMENTS AND OTHER MEANS OF
ENFORCEMENT

The Court did not decide whether the union can bring an action
against the subcontractor under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act 72 for breach of the work preservation agreement.
If the preceding analysis is correct in maintaining that the objective
of a right-to-control strike is to influence the conduct of the general
contractor by means of a cartel of subcontractors, the union should
not be able to recover damages from a subcontractor who breaches
71. Id. at 916.
72. Section 301 states in part: "(a) Suits for violations of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ... may
be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties .
29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
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a work preservation agreement. The cartel can be policed nearly as
effectively through the use of damage suits or penalties assessed
under grievance provisions as by the use of strikes. The subcontractor will be equally deterred from bidding on projects that specify
prefabricated materials if he knows that he will have to pay damages to the union for breaching his work preservation agreement.
At present there does not appear to be a consensus as to
whether unions have a remedy either through an action under section 301 or by invoking the procedures set forth in the collective
bargaining agreement for contract breaches.
The principal issue is the meaning to be given "coercion" as it
is used in section 8(b)(4)(B). Does coercion include union actions
other than those involved in work stoppages? Can it include actions
brought under section 301 for breaches of the work preservation
agreement? Is resort to grievance procedures under the collective
bargaining agreement coercion within the meaning of section

8(b)(4)(ii)(B)? The cases appear to draw a distinction between judicial enforcement of work preservation agreements which are permissible and unilateral action by the union that involves use of economic sanctions.
In NLRB v. IBEW, Local 769,11 Ets-Hokin, a general contractor, was party to a collective bargaining agreement that contained
a clause prohibiting subcontracting work to any employer not represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW). The clause provided that subcontracting to a non-IBEW
employer would be "sufficient cause for cancellation of the agreement." 4 When Ets-Hokin subcontracted work to Rose, an employer
represented by a rival union and paying subminimum wages, Local
769 threatened to terminate the collective bargaining agreement
unless Ets-Hokin took Rose off the project. The Ninth Circuit held
that unilateral rescission of the contract was a form of prohibited
75
economic coercion.
In ACCO Construction Equipment, Inc. v. NLRB, 6 union
assessment of penalties under the grievance provisions of a collective bargaining agreement was held to constitute an unlawful assertion of economic pressure in violation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The
record contained evidence that the union had allowed general contractors to use nonunion equipment dealers to repair heavy, on-site
construction equipment despite a clause in the collective bargaining
agreement prohibiting employment of nonunion repairmen. Coin73.
74.
75.
76.

405 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 163.
511 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1975).
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cident with a union drive to organize equipment dealers, the union
began to enforce the no-subcontracting clause by assessing fines
against the general contractor under the grievance provision of the
contract. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Board's finding that the
union's purpose in resorting to the fining mechanism was to pressure
the general contractor to cease using the services of secondary employers, the dealers."
There was disagreement, however, in CarrierAir Conditioning
Co. v. NLRB 75 between the Board and the Second Circuit on
whether the union's invocation of the contractual grievance procedure was prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). Contrary to its position in ACCO, the Board argued that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) did not
prohibit enforcement of work preservation clauses through peaceful
means provided by the agreement.
The Board asserted that section 8(b)(4)(B) only proscribed economic sanctions; what was involved in this case was not economic
retaliation by the union but resort to an agreed-upon arbitral procedure for compensation for breach of contract. Because of the similarities between arbitration and court proceedings, the Board
argued that the court should treat the former as the equivalent of a

court proceeding for purposes of section 8(b)(4)(B). The court declined to decide the question "whether resort to bona fide arbitration procedures would constitute unlawful coercion," on the ground
that the contract before the court was not the equivalent of bona
7
fide arbitration. 0
The contractual procedures under which the general contractor
was forced to pay a fine were implemented by a Joint Adjustment
Board of twenty-four members, half from the union and half from
the subcontractor's association. Thus the proceeding lacked the
presence of a neutral factfinder, not involved in the dispute. The
Court considered this factor as crucial in distinguishing between the
contract grievance procedure and bona fide arbitration. The fines as
authorized by the agreement "were applied in a way that gave the
union economic leverage over the subcontractor" and that leverage
"had the desired effect of pressuring [subcontractors] to pressure
others to change their business practices.""0
In each of these cases, the courts stated that section
8(b)(4)(ii)(B) limits the enforcement of agreements valid under sec77. Id. at 850.
78. 547 F.2d 1178 (2d Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 1192.
80. Id. at 1193 (quoting from Associated Gen. Contr. v. NLRB, 514 F.2d 433, 439 (9th
Cir. 1975)(assessment of fines against a subcontractor is coercion within section 8(b)(4)(B)).
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tion 8(e) to judicial means.l The Fifth Circuit in Local 48, Sheet
Metal Workers v. Hardy Corp.,52 expressly held that prohibited
coercion in section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) does not preclude judicial enforce-

ment of a hot cargo clause left valid under section 8(e). Hardy, a
general contractor, had subcontracted work to a subcontractor without requiring him to comply with conditions of employment set out
in Hardy's agreement with the union. This conduct violated the
"no-subcontracting" clause of the collective bargaining agreement
and the union processed the breach as a grievance under the contract. The union then filed an action under section 301(a) for enforcement of the arbitration award and for damages for breach of
the agreement. Hardy counterclaimed for damages alleging that the
suit was prohibited coercion under section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). The district court held the clause was valid but denied enforcement and
dismissed the complaint. The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded
for a new trial. The court held that Congress, in exempting hot cargo
and no-subcontracting clauses from the prohibition of section 8(e),
intended to preserve judicial enforcement of those requirements.
Therefore, an action under section 301(a) for breach of the agreement was not prohibited by section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B). 3
While resort to the courts under section 301 should probably not
be coercion in the sense of being a violation of section 8(b)(4)(B),
this is not to say that unions should be able to recover damages from
a subcontractor who breached a work preservation agreement in the
right-to-control context. Recovery of damages from the subcontractor in cases where the decision to use prefabricated materials has
been made by another would have the same coercive effect as would
strike action or assessment of penalties under a collective bargaining clause. The cases discussed above did not involve enforcement
of work preservation clauses against an employer lacking the ability
to resolve the dispute with the union. Thus, in an action by a union
under section 301 for breach of a work preservation agreement, if the
court finds that the employer who is party to the agreement was not
the party ordering use of the prefabricated materials, it can properly
find that there was no violation of the agreement. Since the subcontractor never had control over the claimed work, it could not assign
81. See Carrier Air Cond. Co. v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 1178, 1192 (2d Cir. 1976); ACCO
Constr. Equip., Inc. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 848, 852 (9th Cir. 1975); NLRB v. IBEW, Local 769,
405 F.2d 159, 163 (9th Cir. 1968); See also NLRB v. Local 445, 473 F.2d 249, 253 (2d Cir.
1973); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No. 48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534, 537 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Local 5, United Ass'n of Journeymen v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 366, 369-70 (D.C. Cir. 1963)
(dicta that section 8(e) agreements are enforceable only through court proceedings).
82. 332 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1964).
83. Id. at 687-88.
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the work to the union. In this situation, the union's demand is not
for preservation of work but for work it never had. Consequently, the
union has no claim that the subcontractor has breached his agreement to give to the union all work preserved by the bargaining
agreement.
CONCLUSION

When work prgeervation agreements are enforced, prefabricated materials are kept off the jobsite. Manufacturers of these
materials are foreclosed from competing in the construction industry. It is the elimination of competition between skilled labor and
manufacturers of prefabricated materials that is the vice of work
preservation agreements. Enforcement of such agreements in
"right-to-control" cases deprives the general contractor of the freedom to choose between use of prefabricated materials and employment of skilled labor. It is this freedom of choice that Enterprise
protects. Work preservation agreements remain valid; the preservation of bargaining unit work is a primary goal, but neither the agreement nor activities in pursuit of work preservation are protected
when the union seeks to influence by economic pressure the business
decisions of one outside the collective bargaining agreement.
DIANE AUSTIN

Carey, Kids and Contraceptives:
Privacy's Problem Child
In Carey v. Population Services International the Supreme
Court held that a New York state statute restricting access to
nonprescription contraceptives violated the right to privacy of
both adults and minors. In order to include access to contraceptives within the protection of the privacy right and maintain
consistency with the constitutionality of state laws prohibiting
adultery, fornication and sodomy, the Court found it necessary
to reformulate the rationale of its decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut and subsequent privacy cases. The author of this note
first considers the validity of the Court's new interpretationof
Griswold as creating a right to privacy which protects activities
related to the decision whether or not to bear or beget children.
He then assesses the possible results of applying this newlydefined privacy right to those private consensual activities traditionally forbidden by state laws.

